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Abstract
Multi-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and ser-
vices taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service
time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). In this paper we analyze attributes involved
during the auction process and propose to classify them between verifiable
attributes, unverifiable attributes and auctioneer provided attributes. Ac-
cording to this classification we present VMA2, a new Vickrey-based reverse
multi-attribute auction mechanism which, taking into account the different
types of attributes involved in the auction, allows the auction customization
in order to suit the auctioneer needs. On the one hand, the use of auctioneer
provided attributes enables the inclusion of different auction concepts such
as social welfare, trust or robustness whilst, on the other hand, the use of
verifiable attributes guarantee truthful bidding. The paper exemplifies the
behaviour of VMA2 describing how an egalitarian allocation can be achieved.
The mechanism is then tested in a simulated manufacturing environment and
compared with other existing auction allocation methods.
Keywords: Multi-agent systems, Mechanism design, Multiple criteria
analysis, Supply chain management, Multi-attribute auctions
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1. Introduction
Auctions are gaining relevance in today’s economy. They are increas-
ingly being used in fields such as industry procurement (Strecker, 2004), sup-
ply chain management (Sadeh and Sun, 2003), electronic advertisement (Fu
et al., 2012), service allocation (Pla et al., 2012c; Tavana et Al., 2013) and
electronic commerce (Shih et Al., 2007). For instance, using auctions, man-
ufacturers can obtain feedstock from their providers at the best economic
conditions, while popular web sites can sell their ad space to the marketing
companies which offer the most profitable revenue. In an auction, the auc-
tioneer (e.g. manufacturer) that wishes to buy some good (e.g. feedstock)
announces in a call for proposals what he wants to sell. Interested agents,
bid for selling the good at the price they consider to obtain some payoff.
Then,the auctioneer clear the auction, by determining a winner, and then
setting up the price of the good.
Auctioneers wish to optimize their revenue, and for that purposes, auction
mechanism designers have to provide mechanisms that ensure incentive com-
patibility, meaning that bidders are encourage to provide bids with a price
equal to their true value of the good (Myerson, 1979). Moreover, companies
want to optimize their revenue at the long and mid-term more than in a
single transaction. Revenue is directly related to the number of participants,
it has been proved that the revenue of an auctioneer when k bidders are par-
ticipating in an auction is at least as higher than with a subset of k-1 bidders
(Murillo et al., 2008; Lematre et al., 2003). Thus, keeping the number of par-
ticipants to an efficient number is something that auction designers should
face in order to optimize auctioneer revenues.For doing so, global satisfaction
and preferences of the auction participants should be represented, e.g. they
can be aggregated as social welfare measures do (Chevaleyre et al., 2006).
This aggregation can be conducted in different ways, as maximizing the sum
of all of the revenues and payoffs (utilitarian), or following an egalitarian ap-
proach, so as pursuing a higher equity between agents revenues (Chevaleyre
et al., 2006; Endriss et al., 2003).
Most of the auction research has been concentrated on incentive com-
patibility and social welfare of mechanism regarding the price of the goods.
Other properties such as quality of service and delivering time, have been
considered as side constraints on the auction process, but not in the core
procedure of clearing the auction (Zhao et al., 2011). For example, in cer-
tain auctions, all the bids which do not achieve a minimum quality level are
filtered out and discarded before determining the winner. Multi-attribute
auctions have been designed to deal with different attributes in the win-
ner determination process. In this case, the auctioneer is posed with the
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problem of choosing among a set of Pareto-optimal solutions, a single one.
For example, in a multi-attribute auction in which an auctioneer is wishing
to externalize a task, the auctioneer can characterize the task according to
different attributes, such as price and quality. The auctioneer desires the
highest quality at a good price. He will receive different bids of different
quality and price; it is reasonable to think that quality and price they are of-
ten conflicting criteria, and several combinations are equally optimal. Thus,
the auctioneer should make a decision and pick a combination of attributes.
Depending on how this selection is done, truthful bidding based exclusively
on price is no longer valid. E.g. a bidder which is encouraged to provide
its true value for the price, may provide a fake quality, resulting in harmful
consequences for the auctioneer.
To preserve truthful bidding in scenarios where money it is not the only
key issue (e.g. pay-per-click advertising) new auction mechanisms have been
designed. An example of them are position auctions used in advertisement
scenarios such as Google Ads (Varian, 2007) where auctions occur in a repet-
itive way among a set of bidders. Due to repetition, auctioneers are able to
qualify bidders according to some attributes. When clearing the auction, the
auctioneer unifies the qualification attributes and the received bids in order
to determine the winner. By doing so, this kind of auctioneers guarantees
incentive compatibility, nonetheless, the attributes this mechanism is dealing
with are not manipulable by bidders as they are provided by the auctioneer
itself.
In this paper we are going one step forward, by distinguishing different
types of attributes regarding the good to be sold, verifiable and unverifi-
able attributes, in addition to attributes qualifying the buyers. Verifiable
attributes are the ones that can be checked upon the reception of the good,
as for example, its quality. Conversely, unverifiable attributes, cannot be
checked due to its subjectiveness, as the price of the object (a good can
be expensive or not depending on the utility provided to the buyer). The
third kind of attributes, auctioneer provided attributes, concerns informa-
tion about good itself but also regarding the bidders (e.g. the reliability of a
bidder).
Thus, our first contribution is the classifying of attributes according to
the ownership (bidder or auctioneer provided) and their types (verifiable or
unverifiable). Second, and using attributes of this categorization we design a
new multi-attribute auction mechanism that extends previous multi-attribute
auctions taking ideas from position auctions. Our mechanism lets the auc-
tioneer obtain some desirable properties as incentive compatibility, so that
the bidders are encouraged to bid with the true properties they can pro-
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vide (duration, quality of service) at the best price. Third, the consideration
of attributes regarding the bidders’ behaviour, enables the configuration of
different social welfare approaches (utilitarian, egalitarian) and opens up a
range of possibilities for the incorporation of other auction properties such
as robustness. To illustrate and test the auction mechanism, we simulate an
industrial environment where different agents auction services which must be
carried out by external service providers while trying to obtain a service in
a reasonable price, time and quality.
This paper is organized as follows: first we introduce some basic con-
cepts regarding auctions. In section 3 we present a brief state of the art
of multi-attribute auctions. In section 4 we analyze and classify the differ-
ent attributes that can take part in a multi-attribute auctions. Based on this
classification, in section 5 we present a Multi-attribute auction mechanism to
enact different auction properties. Then, we empirically test the mechanism
in a simulator to illustrate its working, to compare it with some baseline
allocation methods.Finally, in Section 7 we present the conclusions of our
work and we point some possible future lines of research.
2. Auctions Background
An auction is a method for buying and selling goods using a bid system
in which the winner bids obtain the auctioned goods (Krishna, 2002). In
manufacturing domains, as we are used to, auctions often follow a reverse
schema: the auctioneer wish to buy a task to be done, and the bidders are
selling their working capacity at a given price. For the sake of clarity, we will
follow that approach along the paper.
According to that approach (reverse auction), the main steps of an auction
are the following:
1. Auction set up: The auctioneer (a0) sends a call of proposals to all of the
participant agents (a1, . . . an), in which the item(s) it to be bought (e.g.
a task to be done) is described.
2. Bidding: bidders (a1, . . . an) return a bid bi to the auctioneer with the
price which they are offering for the good being auctioned, (where i iden-
tifies the agent who submited the bid). The price may be equal to the
bidders valuation of the item, but not necessarily. The valuation which a
bidder ai gives to an item can be defined using a function vi(it). In an
incentive compatible mechanism it is expected that bidders bid truthfully,
so vi(it) = bi.
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Figure 1: Auction classification according to bidding sides, sold resources, bid composition
and the role of the participants.
3. Winner determination problem: the auctioneer decides the winner(s) that
maximizes its utility (Lehman et al., 2006). The utility is the measure-
ment of the satisfaction received by the participants of an auction, either
the bidders or the auctioneers (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Auc-
tioneer’s utility is related to the revenue, u0(it, bi) = v0(it) − p. He pays
an amount of p for an item it when the winner bid is bi, and the auction-
eer has a value for the item, vo(it), related to its interest on getting it.
Accordingly, the WDP can be formulated as:
argmaxi>0(uo(it, bi)) (1)
And, since the payment p is conditioned by bi and it is constant, it can
be simplified to:
argmini(bi) (2)
4. Payment: the auctioneer pays the money to the winner(s). The utility or
profit of the winner bidder is ui(it, bi) = p− vi(it), where bi is the bid he
submits, and p the payment received . Observe that p is not necessarily
equal to bi since it will depend on the payment mechanism established in
the auction, as explained in the auction taxonomy below.
As Figure 1 shows, there are many auction types depending on several
criteria (Parsons et al., 2011). First, when a participant can play the role
of auctioneer and bidder at the same time, we are talking about double
side auctions; conversely, in a one-side auction, a participant can act just as
auctioneer or bidder. Second, the number of goods or services that are being
sold in an auction determines if an auction is a single-item or a multi-item
auction. Third, the number of attributes of the bid defines if an auction is a
single-dimension (also known as uni-attribute) or a multi-attribute auction.
On the one hand, in single-dimension auctions the bid is composed just by the
price while, on the other hand, in multi-attribute auctions bidders provide
other attributes beside the bid amount (e.g. time or quality). Fourth, if the
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winner of an auction pays the exact amount it has provided in its bid, the
auction is a first price auction; otherwise, if the price is conditioned by the
non-winning bids, is a second price auction. Finally, and according to the
role of the participants, an auction can be classified as forward or reverse.
As stated above, whilst in forward auctions the auctioneer is selling goods or
services and the bidders compete for them, in reverse auctions the auctioneer
is the buyer and the bidders compete to sell their services.
In addition to that classification, auctions can be open-cry or sealed-
bid (Bichler et al., 1999). In open-cry auctions, participants bid openly
against each other, making their bids public and revealing their preferences
to the rest of participants. In this mechanisms, agents privacy is sacrificed
for the sake of transparency. A typical example of these kind of auctions are
English and Dutch auctions. Conversely, in sealed-bid auctions, privacy of
the agents is preserved since all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids to
the auctioneer. In this way, no bidder knows how much the other participants
have bid.
A desirable property that an auction mechanism should provide is to en-
sure that bidders provide truthful bids (incentive compatible mechanism).
This means that bidders obtain a better profit by revealing their real at-
tributes than by providing other values or trying to cheat. Vickrey auctions
are sealed bid, single-item, uni-dimensional, second-price auctions, which
guarantees incentive compatibility (Vickrey, 1961). In this kind of auctions,
the winner bid pays the second best price. Similarly, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
guarantees this property for multi-item auctions (Bartal et al., 2002).
An auction mechanism can be measured in different terms such as the
auctioneers’ revenue or social welfare. On the one hand, the highest the rev-
enue, the better the auction. On the other hand, regarding social welfare,
there is no unique measure, but any aggregation of individual agents prefer-
ences can be used for that purpose. Thus the utilitarian approach tries to
maximize the sum of all of the individual utilities, that is:
maximize
(
n∑
i=0
ui(it)
)
(3)
An egalitarian approach, could consists on maximizing the minimum utility.
maximize (mini(ui(it))) (4)
Other egalitarian approaches could be defined upon the minimization of the
difference between the maximum and minimum utilities (Equation 5) or the
minimization of the sum of difference between agents utilities and the mean
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utility (Equation 6).
minimize (maxi(ui(it))−mini(ui(it))) (5)
minimize
(
n∑
i=0
∣∣∣∣∣
∑n
j=0 uj(it)
n
− ui(it)
∣∣∣∣∣
)
(6)
In general, fair mechanisms maintain agents interested in the auction
after running several auctions, and maintaining the number of participants
increases the revenue of the auctioneer at the mid and long term, (see, for
example, Murillo et al. (2012)’s work for an experimental approach).
3. Related Work
Multi-attribute auctions have been used in the electronic advertisement
markets (Athey and Ellison, 2011), e.g. Varian (2007) proposes to include an
extra attribute provided by the auctioneer itself, not by the bidder. This ap-
proach is similar to trust-based approaches as Ramchurn et al. (2009) where,
to enhance robust allocations, agents describe other agents reliability using
a trust parameter and including this parameter in the winner determination
phase. In the same line, in priority auctions (PA) (Murillo et al., 2012) the
auctioneer uses a priority attribute in order to obtain egalitarian allocations.
In our approach, attributes may come from the auctioneer but bidders can
also express quality values in multiple attributes, so, in some way, our pro-
posal could be considered as an extension of these kinds of auctions (we
propose to use one or more attributes incorpored by the auctioneer but also
multiple attributes by the bidders side).
In multi-attribute auctions, a key work is Che (1993). In it, the author de-
scribes different scenarios regarding the payment rule and demonstrate that,
in order to be incentive compatible, the evaluation of the payment attributes
should match the evaluation of the second best bid, but not necessarily with
the same combination of attributes. David et al. (2002) also follows aggrega-
tions and evaluations of Che (1993) but using a first-price sealed bid auction.
Conversely to ours, we follow a second-price auction in order to obtain an
incentive compatible mechanism.
In a posterior work, Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) propose an adap-
tation of the VCG algorithm (MacKie-Mason and Varian, 1994) for multi-
attribute auctions under an iterative schema (similar to English auctions).
Meaning that bidders are allowed to modify their bids in response to the
bids from other agents. Similar to this work, a framework to develop dif-
ferent kinds of English auctions under a non-linear multi-criteria preference
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schema is presented in Bellosta et al. (2008, 2011). In our approach, we
do not allow iteration as we want to achieve a fast allocation with a con-
trolled communication load. These kind of approaches are more suitable for
long-term contracts with companies, but not at the operational level as we
do.
Mahr and de Weerdt (2006) present a multi-attribute auctioning mech-
anism where agents use preference orders to express their bids. In a later
work, Harrenstein et al. (2009) generalize the approach on what is known
Qualitative Vickrey auctions. However, the authors focus on defining a mech-
anism so that bidders can express qualitative preferences. We are interested
in having a set of different attributes per bid. Thus, handling different at-
tributes increases the number of combinations to manage in a preference order
solution. Finally, Suyama and Yokoo (2004) propose a multi-attribute mech-
anism where the attributes vary depending on the resource bundle assigned
to tasks instead of the resource by itself. This is a complementary approach
towards we need to extend our work in a future research as currently we are
only considering a constant set of attributes.
Other approaches consider attributes different than price as constraints.
E.g., Zhao et al. (2011) present a mechanism for auctions with temporal
constraints based on VCG with a new payment method. Time constraints
are used to filter the participating bids, but time is not considered when
evaluating the bids, leaving aside whether time improves a bid or not. With
our method, we take into account all of the attributes (thus also time) to
optimize the allocation.
Auctions and multi-attribute auctions have been widely used to allocate
resources in workflow environments (Prodan et al., 2011; Puustja¨rvi, 2005;
Zhang et al., 2010). E.g, Pla et al. (2011) compare the efficiency of resource
allocation in workflows when auctioning different types of attributes, how-
ever, the different attributes are not merged or mixed in any stage of the
process. In this line, a framework for the use of reverse multi-attribute auc-
tions for resource allocation in business processes is proposed (Talluri and
Ragatz, 2004). Following the work of these researches, we illustrate and test
our mechanism in the workflow management domain (Pla et al., 2012a).
4. Attribute Typologies in Multi-attribute Auctions
In multi-attribute auctions, the item which is sold is defined due to a
set of attributes, in addition to the price, that it is determined in the auc-
tion process. Multi-attribute auctions may involve many attributes regarding
the item, as for example, the size and quality requested by the buyers, and
the price offered by the sellers. Moreover, in some uni-attribute auctions
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the auction is cleared by taking into account other attributes besides the
ones offered by the bidder. For instance, information about bidders’ past
performance Ramchurn et al. (2009) (reliable or not), previous auction re-
sults Murillo et al. (2012) (the number of auctions which an agent has won)
or opinions which the auctioneer has in regard to bidders Varian (2007) can
be taken into account when deciding the forthcoming winners.
In this section we consider all of the above attributes, as they all in-
fluence the winner determination problem and the payment mechanism of
multi-attribute auctions. In doing so we distinguish two main criteria: at-
tribute ownership, and verifiability. Ownership means that attributes can
be characterized according to the information source (the auctioneer itself
or the participating bidders). On the other hand verifiability concerns the
capability of an attribute to be verified by an agent.
Regarding ownership, we can classify attributes as auctioneer-provided
or bidder-provided:
• Auctioneer-provided attributes: This is the set of attributes which the
auctioneer uses to extend the bidder’s bid. They can be used to qualify bid-
ders or their bids on behalf of a given objective criteria. These attributes
can involve: number of withdraws on behalf of a given winner, number of
times the bidder has won an auction, number of times the bidder reported
a lower quality that the one it bid for, etc. Moreover, these attributes can
be used to express the subjective auctioneer beliefs regarding bidders or
their bids. For instance, they can be used to define reputations or how
popular a bidder is according to the auctioneer’s perspective. Since it can
be assumed that an auctioneer will not try to deceive itself, we can say
that auctioneer-provided attributes are trustable and the auction mech-
anism does not need to concern about their reliability. Those attributes
can then be used to include fairness or other properties in the auction
mechanism.
• Bidder-provided attributes: they are the set of attributes that bidders
express regarding the qualification of the good to be served.
Bidder-provided attributes can be, in turn, classified according to the
capability of the auctioneer to verify them. We distinguis to kind of attributes
:
• Unverifiable bidder attributes: These are the set of attributes de-
fined by an agent whose true values are only known by the agent itself.
These attributes are also the ones which define the auction currency. A
typical example of this kind of attribute is the economic value which a
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bidder offers or asks to obtain an item or for providing a service. The
bidder knows its true value, however the auctioneer has no way to know
the true value of the attribute neither before nor after delivering the auc-
tioned item. Similarly, bidders could trade permits for generating certain
amounts of CO2 emissions (e.g. as happens with emissions trading between
countries) Hoesch-Klohe et al. (2010).
Despite the fact that there can be more than one unverifiable attribute,
auctions are typically designed using only one unverifiable attribute due to
the complexity of introducing more than one.In cases where there is more
than one currency attribute Rackson et al. (2002) (e.g. international auc-
tions), all the attributes are translated into a unique attribute or currency
so the auctioneer only deals with one type of unverifiable attribute (for
example a currency which acts as a standard monetary unit or a virtual
currency). Therefore, despite the existence of more than one unverifiable
attribute during the bidding process, the auction is performed considering
just one single unverifiable attribute. From this point of view, inthis paper
we assume that there can only be one currency in an auction and when
we refer to an unverifiable attribute we mean the unique attribute which
acts as currency for the auction (namely the attribute itself or the virtual
currency which aggregates more than one unverifiable attributes).
• Verifiable bidder attributes: these are the set of attributes which are
defined by agents whose true value can be known and checked by another
agent. It does not matter if they can be verified before or after delivering
the auctioned item, however, this verification must always be completed
before the payment is performed. Examples of this type of attribute are
delivery times, electricity consumption or other physical specifications. For
example when auctioning a task which will be carried out by a bidder,
the bidder can specify a certain delivery time t. Once the task has been
completed the auctioneer can then check if the final delivery time t′ was as
specified during the bidding process. As these attributes can be checked,
they can be used to adjust payment to bidders, to evaluate if the item
delivery has been succesful or to establish parameters to describe bidder
qualities (auctioneer-provided attributes).
In Figure 2 we illustrate a simple multi-attribute auction in which the
three different types of attributes are used. Auctioneer A calls an auction in
order to find an agent to perform a certain task. Bidders send bids containing
the economic cost they expect to charge for the task (attribute b) and the
delivery time they propose (dt). Once the bidders have sent their proposals,
A will include a reliability attribute r which rates his satisfaction regarding
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Figure 2: Example of the attribute types used in the bidding process: Cost is a unveri-
fiable bidder provider attribute, delivery time a verifiable bidder provided attribute and
reliability is an auctioneer provided attribute.
previous deals with the different bidders. Finally, the winner of the auction is
computed using every attribute involved in the auction process (b, dt, r). In
this example b is a unverifiable bidder attribute as the auctioneer cannot know
the true value of the cost attribute for each bid, at most, it can estimate it;
dt is a verifiable bidder attribute as, once the task is finished, the auctioneer
can compare the real delivery time dt′ with the one which was provided in
the bid; finally, r is an auctioneer-provided attribute as it is added into the
bid by the auctioneer itself and it is also used to determine the winner of the
auction.
5. VMA2: Multi-attribute auction based on verifiable, unverifi-
able, and auctioneer-provided attributes
Using the classification of attributes provided in the previous section
we present the VMA2 multi-attribute auction mechanism. VMA2 follows
a Vickrey-based approach to guarantee the incentive compatibility of the
mechanism (Pla et al., 2013).
Let be (a1, . . . , an) the bidders, and a0 the auctioneer, who wants to buy
an item it. This time, however, the auctioneer in addition to the price, re-
quires additional attributes from the item, as for example, price and quality.
Each agent provides one bid according to their expected utility, bi. The bid
is multi-dimensional, including unverifiable attributes Aui , as well as veri-
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fiable ones, Avi . The auctioneer, solves the winner determination problem
with modified bids, b′i, so that each original bid bi has been extended with
attributes the auctioneer has about the bidder Api , b
′
i = bi
⊕
Api (auctioneer-
provided attributes). Then, the problem the auctioneer is faced is to find the
value that maximize its utility. The questions to be answered include: how
bidders deal with multidimensional item descriptions; is the revenue meaning
only the cheapest price? Moreover, and regarding the payment mechanism,
what happens if the agents cheat on the verifiable attributes (e.g. the delivery
time)? To answer to all of these questions, the different steps of the auction
process should be revised, taking into account the nature of the attributes
involved.
We assume that auctions are repeated along time there are no externalities
in the process, as well as no budget constraints by any agent and that bids
are presented under sealed bid (bids presented by the agents are unknown
for the rest of the auction participants and are not made public at any time).
Regarding attributes, we adopt the following notation:
• Auctioneer provided attributes Ap: atp1 ∈ Dp1, . . . , atpmp ∈ Dpmp
• Verifiable (bidder provided) attributes Av: atv1 ∈ Dv1 , . . . , atvmv ∈ Dvmv
• Unverifiable (bidder provided) attributes Au: atu ∈ Du
5.1. Request for proposal - The role of verifiable attributes
Once an agent wants to buy an item, it summons an auction. An item
is not necessarily a physical object. For example, it can be a service exter-
nalization, or the need of a resource to deploy a task. The auctioneer tries
to obtain the best option at the best possible price. For that purpose, the
agent builds a call for proposal cfp defining the item to be purchased to the
bidders.
cfp = 〈taskId, (atv1, Rv1), . . . (atvmv , Rvmv)〉 (7)
where atvi is the id of a verifiable attribute, and R
v
i ⊆ Dvi the projection
of the attribute original domain and mv the number of verifiable attributes
involved in the auction. For example, if atv1 is the delivery time, defined in
N, with 0 the lowest value (earlier time), a call for proposal could contain
(deliveryT ime, [2..5]) meaning that the auctioneer is requesting a task to be
done between 2 and 5 hours. Of course, attribute interpretation should be
supported by an ontology, that is out of the scope of this paper.
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5.2. Bidding - The role of unverifiable attributes
When an agent ai receives a call for proposals cfp it analyzes if he is
interested in participating in the auction. For that purpose he determines its
capacity of attending a request Avi ⊆ Rv1 × Rvmv , with Avi = (atv1i, . . . , atvmvi).
Since the auction follows a sealed bid schema and the bidder does not know
which bids his contenders offered in past auction, the bidder is only concerned
about his offer. In the case the bidder is interested in participating, he needs
to return a bid he considers it will maximizes its expected utility and which
includes unverifiable attributes (usually the price he requires).
The true value of the unverifiable attribute is conditioned by the rest of
the attributes which the bidders offer, corresponding to the valuation which
the bidder makes of the verifiable attributes it bids: vi(A
v
i ) = A
u
i . Thus, the
resulting bid structure is as follwos:
bi = A
u
i ⊕ Avi = (atui , atv1i, . . . , atvmvi) (8)
Cheating agents provide bids with different values than their true valu-
ations. For example, with a bid bi′ = (at
u′
i , at
v′
1i, . . . , at
v′
mvi) where A
v
i 6= Av′i
or Au
′
i 6= vi(Avi ), the agent could be offering better attributes than its skills
or a lower price1, with the aim of deceiving the mechanism and winning the
auction with better economical conditions.
5.3. Winner determination - The role of auctioneer provided attributes
Upon the reception of the bids, the auctioneer extends them with the in-
formation recorded about the bidders, b′i = bi⊕Api , where Api is the auctioneer
provided attributes, atp1i, . . . , at
p
mpi
.Api may be used to represent auctioneer
opinions (such as trust in the bidder) or to add certain properties to the auc-
tion (e.g., fairness can be obtained by the use of a priority attribute based
on previous auctions outcomes). As a result, a modified bid which includes
the auctioneer provided attributes is obtained:
b′i = (at
u
i , at
v
1i, . . . , at
v
mvi, at
p
1i, . . . , at
p
mpi
) (9)
The attributes used to extend the bid will affect the characteristics of the
auction and the resulting allocations:
• Egalitarian social welfare: A priority attribute which defines bidder’s
history (number of auctions won, lost and participated) can be used in
order to enhance the equity and fairness of the allocations. This type of
1We assume that bidders ara able to estimate their skills accurately
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allocation can be useful to keep bidders interested in future auctions and to
avoid recurrent auction problems such as the bidders drop problem Murillo
et al. (2012); Lematre et al. (2003).
For instance, the auctioneer can assign a priority attribute wi ∈ [0, 1] to
each bidder, according to the ratio between the number of auctions in
which they have participated, and the auctions they have lost within a
specific time window (Equation 10). The higher the ratio of lost auctions,
the higher the priority of the bidder, meaning that a bidder with high
priority should be awarded a soon to prevent the agent from leaving the
market due to too low incomes.
wi = 1− 1 + auctions woni
1 + auctions participatedi
(10)
The method used to compute bidders’ priorities can affect the outcomes of
the auction, as it will condition who the winner of the auction is. Moreover,
the use of a priority attribute can condition the arrival of new bidders as
newcomers may have less options of winning an auction than bidders that
are arleady inside the market. For instance, the approach comented above
would allow the arrival of new bidders to the market, however, they would
have a lower priority than bidders with a bad ratio of won/participated
auctions; the auctioneer would consider that newcommers are not as su-
ceptible to leave the auction as a bidder with a bad auction record. In this
situation a newcomer would have the same priority than an auction which
had won all the auctions in which it had participated or than an auction
who decided to stay off the last auctions.
• Robustness: The inclusion of a trust attribute τi ∈ (0, 1] defining the
reliability of the bidder will increase the robustness of the allocations. τ
may express the relation between the number of auctions won and the
success of delivering the won items, in this way, not reliable bidders would
decrease their chances to win future auctions. The success of the delivery
could be measured upon the fulfilment of the verifiable attributes provided
in the winner bid (e.g. delivering an item later than agreed would be
considered a failure whilst providing it on time would be considered as a
success).
It is important to take into account that the use of auctioneer provided at-
tributes may also affect the bidders’ behaviour. For instance, the use of a
trust attribute can incentive bidders to improve their accuracy when esti-
mating their delivery times but an abuse of this attribute may lead certain
bidders to abandon the auction due an unexpected estimation error at the
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early stage of the allocation process. Thus, we recommend mechanism de-
signers to do a deep study of what an attribute can imply before adding it
to the auction mechanism.
Once the different bids have been extended, the auctioneer needs to deter-
mine the winner bid that maximize its expected utility. In single dimensional
auctions, the utility of the auctioneer u0 depends on the item valuation v0 and
the payment performed p (see section2). However, in the multi-dimensional
case, there are several possible combinations atv1i, . . . , at
v
mvi ∈ Rv1×Rvmv which
are feasible. Particularly, the utility can be defined on the basis of the Nadir
point (the worst case scenario), Avw = at
v
1w, . . . , at
v
mvw, and any bid b
′
i should
improve this situation. For example, the worst situation could be defined
as the latest time of a task which an agent can accept. For that purpose,
we need to define an evaluation function on bids, f0(b
′
i), that provides a real
value, such that u0(cfp, b
′
i) = v0(A
v
w) − f0(b′i). The highest the utility, the
lowest f0. Thus, the evaluation function value must decrease when the bid
solution is better.
The evaluation function f0 should represent the different auctioneers pref-
erences (different auctioneers may have different evaluation functions). For
example, low price (unverifiable attribute), high quality (verifiable attribute)
and high priority (auctioneer provided attribute) should be combined. For
that purpose, a multicriteria function that fulfill a set of conditions within the
range of the attributes could be used (Pla et al., 2012b). Such a function,
should fulfill certain conditions. First, the functions used for the evalua-
tion must be a real-valued function. Given a bid, the evaluation func-
tion must return a real number in order to compute the payment as stated
above. Second, the evaluation function must be monotonic. If one of the
attributes of a bid is improved, the result of the evaluation function will
change consequently, guarantying that a better bid will not obtain a worse
evaluation. Finally, in order to allow the mechanism to calculate the pay-
ment, the evaluation function must have a bijective behavior regarding the
auction currency. Taking this into account, we require f0 to have a partial
anti function f−10 which, given the result of the evaluation function, the auc-
tioneer provided attributes and the verifiable attributes, returns the value
of the unverifiable bidder attribute. Thus, if f0(b
′
i) = x, the partial anti-
function f−10 will return the unverifiable attribute which acts as currency,
f−10 (x, at
v
1i, . . . , at
v
mvi, at
p
1i, . . . , at
p
mpi
) = atui . Some of the evaluation func-
tions which meet these requirements are the product, some mathematical
norms such as the Euclidean norm, the weighted sum or the weighted sum
of functions (Pla et al., 2012b).
Given the previously defined utility function of the auctioneer is u0(cfp, b
′
i) =
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v0(A
v
w)− f0(b′i), the goal of the auctioneer is to minimize f0:
argmini(f0(b
′
i)) (11)
The auctioneer clears the market by sorting the bids (b′σ(i) where σ(i)
indicates the rank of the bid) from the best evaluation (the one with the
lowest value) to the worst. The winner of the auction is the first in the
ranking: b′1 (and b′2 the second best bid).
5.4. Payment - Playing all the attributes together
The payment mechanism is inspired in Vickrey and position auctions but
taking into account the peculiarities of reverse multiattribute auctions. In
Vickrey auctions, the winner bid receives just the necessary amount to beat
the second highest bid (Equation 13). In other words, the payment the winner
receives is the price it should have bid to obtain the same evaluation as the
second highest bid. The winner bid is (atu1 , at
v
1, . . . , at
v
mv1, at
p
1, . . . , at
p
mp1) with
a valuation of f0(at
u
1 , at
v
1, . . . , at
v
mv1, at
p
1, . . . , at
p
mp1). In order to simplify the
comprehension of the payment mechanism and to simplify notation, we will
use Avi and A
p
i to refer to the the bid components regarding bidder verifiable
attributes and auctioneer provided attributes, being:
f0(b
′
i) = f0(at
u
i , at
v
1i, . . . , at
v
mvi, at
p
1i, . . . , at
p
mpi
) = f0(〈atui , Avi , Api 〉) (12)
Thus, the payment (p) to the winner should equal the offer provided by
the second best bid according to the auctioneer valuation, f0(b
′
2). That poses
the problem of finding the value of p which, combined with the attributes of
the winning bid, equals the valuation of the second best bid; that is
f0(〈p,Av1, Ap1〉) = f0(b′2) (13)
Therefore, the payment is obtained by means of the antifunction f−10 :
p = f−10 (f0(b
′
2), A
v
1, A
p
1) (14)
Where p is the payment which will be received by the single winner of our
mechanism.
However, this payment mechanism does not prevent the bidders to lie
regarding their verifiable attributes since including a false attribute could
increase the chances to win the auction while not being penalized in the
payment. For example, a bidder could submit a bid saying that it will finish
its task in 10 minutes when actually it knows it will finish the task in 15
minutes. This lie would have increased the chances of the bidder to win the
auction.
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Thus we adapt the payment mechanism in order to penalize dishonest bid-
ders: when bidders intentionally lie to win the auction, payment is obtained
by equating the initial bid evaluation (with the false value of the attribute)
to the assessment of real goods (with the true value of the attribute).That
is, since the payment is performed after a task or service has been completed
or after an item has been delivered, the auctioneer can measure the quality
of the received item and realize that instead of receiving the agreed product
it got one with characteristics Av
′
i = at
v′
1i, . . . , at
v′
mvi. When this situation
occurs, the payment mechanism is based on making the valuation of the ob-
tained qualities same as the bid ones; in other words, we maintain the utility
of the auctioneer.
f0(〈p,Av′1 , Ap1〉) = f0(b′1) (15)
p = f−10 (f0(b
′
1), A
v′
1 , A
p
1) (16)
Where Av
′
is the vector of verifiable attributes obtained by the auctioneer
after the delivery process (and that we compare with the true attributes of
the bidder).
In regard of the auctioneer provided attributes, the mechanism does not
have to be concerned about them inasmuch they express a set of beliefs
regarding the bidder and the auctioneer itself during the auction process,
not the delivered item. Thus, they cannot be changed during the delivery as
they concern to a past time instant.
Summing up, our payment proposal is a two case method:
p =
{
f−10 (f0(b
′
2), A
v
1, A
p
1) if A
v′
1  Av1
f−10 (f0(b
′
1), A
v′
1 , A
p
1) if A
v′
1 ≺ Av1
(17)
where operator  means the same or better than and ≺ worse than.
In this way, the bidder is encouraged to bid truthfully: regarding unver-
ifiable attributes, overbidding attributes will reduce his chances of winning
the auction without increasing its payment whilst underbidding will increase
its risk of working below its real price (resulting in a negative utility). Re-
specting verifiable attributes, the bidder is also encouraged to bid truthfuly:
if the bidder provides its service or good as it was indicated in the bid, he will
receive the economical amount that he was expecting or even more (the exact
value to beat the following highest bid), increasing its utility. However, if the
bidder lies and delivers its product in worst conditions than the ones agreed
it will not receive the payment he expected, reducing its utility. Extended
studies regarding the strategy proofness can be found in (Pla et al., 2013).
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5.5. A simple example
To illustrate the behaviour of the VMA2 we present a simple example
in which an auctioneer needs to externalize a service S0 which must be fin-
ished before a certain time t0 and must fulfill a minimum quality q0. As the
auctioneer must accomplish other services which depended on S0, the ear-
lier S0 is finished, the higher will be its satisfaction or utility as it will have
more time to dedicate to the rest of the tasks (e.g. hiring slower but cheaper
providers). In the same way, a higher quality and a lower price will increase
the auctioneer’s utility.
In the first step the auctioneer would provide a call for proposals defining
the minimum required quality q0 = 1 and the maximum delivery time t0 =
100, where q0 and t0 are verifiable attributes (A
v
0). Delivering the service too
early (before 60 minutes) may cause inventory problems, whilst delivering the
task too late may difficult the development of depending tasks, therefore.
Therefore, the auctioneer defines the domain of the verfiable attributes as
q ∈ [1, 2] and t ∈ (60, 100]. The auctioneer values the worst case allocation
qw, tw with a score of 8000 (v0(qw, tw) = 8000). Thus, the resulting call for
proposals is the following:
cfp = 〈S0, (q, [1, 2]), (t, [60, 100])〉 (18)
When a bidder receives the cfp, it checks if he is able to perform the
desired task with the asked or better conditions. If so, he calculates the
attributes he can provide and the cost it will result from them and offers his
bid bi. E.g, if a bidder aa is able to perform the desired task in 80 minutes
(ta = 80) with a quality of 1.2 (qa = 1.2) with an economic cost (ec) of 100 he
would provide a bid ba = (100, 1.2, 80) where 100 is the economic cost of the
bid, an unverifiable attribute. In the case that aa tried to win the auction
by cheating, he could have submitted a bid (90, 1.2, 75), (100, 1.5, 25) or any
other bid with false attributes.
The auctioneer could receive other bids from other agents (ab, ac, see
Table 1). Next, it extends the bids with the information concerning bidders
(auctioneer provided attributes Ap) resulting in a new extended bid b′i . In
this case, the auctioneer just adds a priority w based on past auctions results
in order to achieve an egalitarian social welfare. Then, it decides the winner
of the auction using the an evaluation function which derives from his utility
function, in this case a product of all the attributes (Equation 19)
fo(b
′
i) = f0(〈eci, qi, ti, wi〉) = eci ∗
1
qi
∗ ti ∗ wi (19)
The auctioneer clears the auction by selecting the bid which obtains the best
evaluation, in this case, bidder aa.
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Au Av Ap
Bi bi eci qi ti wi b
′
i f(b
′
i) rank
aa ((100),(1.2,80)) 100 1.2 80 0.8 (100,1.2,80,0.8) 5333,33 1
ab ((95),(1.2,90)) 95 1.2 90 0.8 (95,1.2,90,0.8) 5700,00 3
ac ((100),(1.3,85)) 100 1.3 85 0.85 (100,1.3,85,0.85) 5557,69 2
Table 1: List of bids and their corresponding ranks and evaluations.
Finally, when the bidder finishes S0, the auctioneer evaluates the ob-
tained result an proceeds to pay the bidder. As the payment mechanism
considers two situations, we illustrate two different payment scenarios: when
the delivered items meets the auction agreement and when the bidder breaks
it.
• In the case bidder aa finishes S0 with ta and qa, it will receive the necessary
amount it should have bid to beat the second best bid (bider ac). So the
payment would be:
f0(〈p, qa, ta, wa〉) = f0(〈ecc, qc, tc, wc〉) (20)
p =
100 ∗ 1
1.3
∗ 85 ∗ 0.85
1
1.2
∗ 80 ∗ 0.8 (21)
p = 104.21 (22)
In consequence, the utility of the auctioneer is:
v0(qw, tw)− f0(104.21, 1.2, 80, 0.8) (23)
u0 = 8000− 5557, 87 = 2442, 23 (24)
• In the other hand, if A finishes S0 with t′a ≺ ta (delayed2) or q′a ≺ qa, it
will receive the necessary amount it should have bid to achieve the same
evaluation he obtained with the original bid. To illustrate that, we will
consider t′a = 90 and q
′
a = 1.15.
f0(〈p, q′a, t′a, wa〉) = f0(〈eca, qa, ta, wa〉) (25)
p =
100 ∗ 1
1.2
∗ 80 ∗ 0.8
1
1.15
∗ 90 ∗ 0.8 (26)
2notice that ≺ means worse than (see Equation 17)
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p = 85.19 (27)
In consequence, the utility of the auctioneer is:
v0(qw, tw)− f0(85.19, 1.15, 90, 0.8) (28)
u0 = 8000− 5333, 33 = 2666, 66 (29)
In this way, it can be seen how the utility of the auctioneer does not decrease
when the bidder fails in delivering the agreed service.
6. Experimentation
To test and illustrate the behaviour of the presented mechanism, we sim-
ulated the processes and the services required by a company during a certain
time period.
6.1. Simulation Environment
The simulation tool used to test the mechanisms described reproduces
the operation of an industrial environment where companies need to solve
different issues ? (e.g. unforeseen faults, local system crashes, customer
problems, etc.) by outsourcing certain tasks. When an incident is detected,
a preliminary diagnosis process determines the incident typology, the task
(or set of tasks) which must be carried in order to solve the incidence and
its maximum deadline. It, then, determines the order in which the tasks
must be performed and the tasks which need to be assigned to an external
provider.
In the simulation, each entity (which can correspond to a company, a
team, a department, etc.) is represented by an agent which acts selfishly,
working solely for its own benefit. The participants in the simulation can
play two different roles: they can act as service agent SA (an agent which
controls a workflow and needs to externalize a task) or as a resource provider
agent RP which wants to perform a task for a payment. Despite the fact an
entity can perform both roles (but not within the same auction), for the sake
of simplicity and to make the experiments more comprehensible, agents can
take only one role during the simulation. Thus, service agents will always
act as the auctioneers whilst resource provider agents will always be bidders
(Figure 3).
The data used to model the simulation has been extracted from the re-
crods of an industrial organization 3. These records contain information
3Due to confidentiality agreements we cannot reveal the name of the company
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regarding unexpected issues (unexpected faults, customer complaints, revi-
sions, etc.) the company has had to deal with. The data was collected over
two years and is composed of information concerning the tasks which were
performed in order to solve these issues (the type of task performed, the emer-
gency level of each task, tasks deadlines, the partner or team which developed
each task, task durations, etc.). Using this records we have estimated the
probability distribution function that represents the task occurrence during
an average day. The same has been done to model the urgency parameter
distribution (which defines the deadline of each task) and the task service du-
rations of each resource provider (each resource provider has different time
distributions for each kind of task). These distributions are then used to
execute the simulations4.
In the simulation there are 7 service agents are in charge of managing
different types of tasks (one type per agent) and 8 resource providers which
compete to perform those tasks (each resource provider can perform different
tasks according to Table 2). The agents which take part in the simulation
are defined as follows:
• Service Agents (SA): When a service agent detects an incidence,
a preliminary diagnosis process determines its typology, its maximum
delivery time and other possible attributes required. Then, the agent
calls for an an auction in order to outsource the task which will resolve
the incidence. Each task is defined by its typology (which determines
the type of resources required to perform the task) and its delivery
time.
Service agents are characterized by:
– The type of the service task of which it is in charge (1 to 7). Each
type of task can only be performed by certain types of resource
provider (see Table 2).
– The probability distribution function that defines the task occur-
rence. In the simulation, tasks appear following this probability
function.
– The probability distribution function that defines the emergency
level of the tasks. Every time the service agent wishes to out-
source a task it assigns an emergency level to it according to its
emergency parameter distribution function. The emergency level
4The specific probability distributions for each type of resource and task can be found
in Torrent and Pla (2013).
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S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7
RP1 X X X X X X X RP5 X X X
RP2 X X X X X X X RP6 X
RP3 X X X X X X X RP7 X X X X
RP4 X X X X X X RP8 X X X
Table 2: Capacity of a resource provider (RP) to develop a service (S).
Emergency Level 1 2 3 4
Maximum duration (minutes) 30 120 300 600
Table 3: Relationship between the urgency of a service and its maximum execution time.
is used to establish the execution deadline for each task (see Ta-
ble 3).
• Resource Provider Agents (RP): When a resource provider re-
ceives a call for proposals it evaluates whether it can perform the task
required(given its capacity and type) and its true values (its cost and
expected delivery time). With this information the agent can decide
if it wants to participate into the auction and defines the bid to be
submitted.
Resource providers are defined by:
– The type of the resource provider (1 to 8). It determines the tasks
which the agent can perform (see Table 2).
– Its capacity: each resource provider can perform only one task at
a time.
– A probability distribution function specifying the time it takes to
perform each task. If the resource provider can perform n tasks,
the resource provider will have n different time distributions.
– The cost the agent incurs for performing each task
– Its bidding strategy (which can be adaptative bidding, honest bid-
ding or cheating).
6.2. Scenarios
We test our approach in three different scenarios:
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Figure 3: Multi-Agent System architecture for the simulation
6.2.1. Scenario 1: Efficiency
The goal of the first scenario is to analyze the behaviour of the auction
mechanism regarding the attributes in an independent way (economic cost
for unverifiable attributes and delays for verifiable ones). For that purpose,
efficiency achieved with VMA2 is compared with previous approaches:
• First price uni-attribute auction (bid amount): The resource provider
with the cheapest price is the bidder which will realize the service. Its pay-
ment will be the economic amount indicated in the bid.
• First price uni-attribute auction (delivery time): The resource
provider with the fastest delivery time is the bidder which will carry out
the service. Its payment will be the economic amount indicated in the bid.
• Vickrey multi-attribute auction: The winner determination problem
is computed as in VMA2 but payment is calculated as in Equation 14.
Thus, payment is performed independently of the outcomes of the task.
Product is used as evaluation function (f0(b, t) = b ∗ t) 5.
• Verifiable and Unverifiable Multi-attribute Auction VMA2: The
winner and his payment is determined using the mechanism presented in
Section 5. The main difference with the Vickrey multi-attribute auction is
that payment is now computed with the received verifiable attributes as
explained in Equation 17. Product is used as evaluation function (f0(b, t) =
b ∗ t).
5Previous studies have shown that product offers more equilibrated allocations than
other evaluation functions (Pla et al., 2012b)
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In this scenario all the bidders follow an adaptative bidding strategy,
adapting the bids they offer to increase the chances of winning the auction
and maximizing their benefits (Lee and Szymanski, 2005).
6.2.2. Scenario2: Strategy Proofness
The main objective of this scenario is to analyze the incentive compatibil-
ity of the mechanism. Moreover, we point how VMA2 preserves auctioneers
utility when bidders try to obtain higher benefits by manipulating the at-
tributes of their bids. For that purpose we compare a simulation where all the
agents bid following an honest strategy (they bid the attributes they think
they will be able to deliver) with a simulation where four resource providers
(RP5 to RP8) try to manipulate the bid attributes and the rest bid honestly.
6.2.3. Scenario 3: Handling auctioneer provided attributes
The goal of the third scenario is to show how social welfare goals can
be implemented by means of auctioneer provided attributes.For that pur-
pose, the experiment realized in Scenario 1 is repeated using VMA2 and an
auctioneer provided priority attribute w. Moreover, the mechanism is com-
pared with a multi-attribute adaptation of the PA mechanism (Murillo et al.,
2008) where w is only used to determine the winner but not to compute the
payment.
In both cases (VMA2 and PA), the priority is calculated using the num-
ber of auctions bidders have participated since the last time they won (Equa-
tion 30) where a lower w means that they have more chances to win the next
auction, as follows:
wi =
1
1 + lwi
(30)
where lwi corresponds to the number of auctions bidder ai has participated
since the last time it won and wi its priority.
6.3. Results and Discussion
In this subsection the results of the proposed scenarios are shown and dis-
cussed. In the first scenario,as the objective of the experiment is to evaluate
the attributes independently, the results are evaluated in terms of economic
cost and delays (when a service is delivered after its maximum execution
time, see Table 3). In the second scenario, in addition to economic cost and
delays, utility is used to evaluate the resulting allocations when considering
all the attributes. Finally, in the last scenario, the results are also in terms
of social welfare using the Gini’s index (Gastwirth, 1972).
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Figure 4: Total task allocation cost for each Service Agent using different allocation mech-
anisms: Vickrey multi-attribute auction (blue), VMA2 (red), choosing the cheapest re-
sources provider (green) and choosing the fastest resource provider (purple).
6.3.1. Scenario1
This scenario analyzes the performance of VMA2 against other three
auction mechanisms in terms of economic cost and delays. Figure 4 shows
the economic amount the 7 different service agents had to spent in order to
allocate their tasks to a resource provider. Yellow and red bars show the eco-
nomic cost when assigning the tasks to resource using uni-attribute auctions,
following a policy of assigning the cheapest or the fastest resource whilst
blue bars present the economic expense when using an auction mechanism:
clear blue for the Vickrey multi-attribute mechanism and dark blue for the
mechanism presented in this paper, VMA2. The chart clearly shows that fol-
lowing the strategy of picking the fastest resource provider leads to a higher
economic cost for the service execution. This is a logical result as this strat-
egy ignores the economic cost of the resources. Regarding the other three
strategies it is not clear which one is the most efficient in economic terms as
the most inexpensive strategy varies according to the kind of service that has
been allocated. E.g. we can see how for SA7 the Vickrey auction results in a
lower economic investment, however, for SA2 the Vickrey auction results in
the worst strategy in economic terms (excluding the fastest resource strat-
egy). If we focus on VMA2 we can see that this strategy is the one which
gives best economic results to four service agents (SA1, SA2, SA5 and SA6),
the second best choice for SA4 and SA7 and the worst for SA3.
To complete the information given in the previous paragraph, Figure 5
shows a box plot of the mean cost of a service in the different simulations,
offering a global view of a service cost. The chart shows that VMA2 reduces
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Figure 5: Mean cost for a service alloca-
tion when using different allocation methods:
Vickrey multi-attribute auction (1), VMA2
(2), choosing the cheapest resource provider
(3) and choosing the fastest provider (4).
Figure 6: Delays produced in the simula-
tion when using different allocation methods:
Vickrey multi-attribute auction (1), VMA2
(2), choosing the cheapest resource provider
(3) and choosing the fastest provider (4).
the cost for the service allocation, this fact is probably caused by the payment
reduction the service agents apply when the checkable attributes are not
respected (when the item is not delivered as it was specified).
Regarding the delays produced in the system (Figure 6), we can see how
the allocation strategy which has obtained a lower number of delays is the
fastest resource choice while the worst results have been achieved by the
cheapest resource strategy. This two facts are not surprising as the first
policy is focused exclusively in time efficiency while the second one ignores
this parameter. Regarding VMA2 and the multi-attribute Vickrey auction,
it can be seen that they obtain a very similar number of delays. This is
a logical fact as both use the same evaluation function to determine the
winner of the auction, favoring the same kind of resource provider. They
are clearly less sensitive to delays than the best price choice and the number
of delays produced is not much higher than the delays produced using the
fastest resource choice.
This experiment shows how VMA2 can provide a good compromise among
the different attributes which take part in the resource allocation process. It
can achieve as competitive prices as electing the cheaper resource provider
without jeopardizing the quality of the rest of the attributes. Comparing our
approach with a classical Vickrey multi-attribute auction we can see how,
if using the same evaluation functions, the results regarding the quality of
the auction are analogue, however, when comparing the economic efficiency
against a classic Vickrey multi-attribute auction, VMA2 reduces costs for
the auctioneer as it pays less to bidders which breaches the submitted bid.
In other words, VMA2 preserves the auctioneer utility when bidders break
the auctioneer agreement. It is important to remark than in an ideal world
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Figure 7: Economic amount spent by
agents to allocate tasks to resources us-
ing different task allocation methods: Vick-
rey multi-attribute auction (blue), VMA2
(red), choosing the cheapest resource
provider (green) and choosing the fastest
provider (purple).
Figure 8: Auctioneers utilities obtained by
the resulting task allocation when using
different task allocation methods: Vick-
rey multi-attribute auction (blue), VMA2
(red), choosing the cheapest resource
provider (green) and choosing the fastest
provider (purple).
where all the bidders respect the submitted bids, VMA2 and Vickrey Multi-
attribute auctions would act exactly in the same way and would obtain the
same results (both in economic and in attribute efficiency).
6.3.2. Scenario2
Now, we analyze the behaviour of VMA2 in front of cheating agents.
Figures 7 8 and 9 show the results of the second experiment. The first one
shows the economic cost of each service using the Vickrey multi-attribute
auction and the VMA2 when all the bidders follow an honest strategy (blue
and red lines) and when four of them try to manipulate the attributes (green
and purple). Figure 8 shows the auctioneers utilities in the same contexts
(following the same colour pattern). The first remarkable thing of these
charts is that when all the bidders act following an honest strategy both
the Vickrey auction and VMA2 obtain similar results, the service cost is
quite similar and the same for the auctioneers utilities. As mentioned above,
this reflects the fact that when all the bidders follow an honest strategy
the Vickrey auction and VMA2 are analogue and we can blame the small
difference between the obtained results to the randomness of the simulation.
If focusing on the simulations where bidders 5 to 8 have tried to manipulate
the bid, we can see how when using the Vickrey auction the auctioneers
have paid a small overprice as they evaluated the offered bids as very good
items. However, when the received attributes where not the ones in the
27
Figure 9: Resource providers (bidders) revenue when using different task allocation meth-
ods: Vickrey multi-attribute auction (blue), VMA2 (red), choosing the cheapest resource
provider (green) and choosing the fastest provider (purple).
auction agreement, lowering their utility. The opposite happens when using
VMA2, Figure 7 shows that auctioneers have paid a lower price as when
they detected that the bidded attributes where not true. This has made
its utility to be maintained despite having received worse attributes than
expected (Figure 8).
Regarding the bidders point of view, Figure 9 clearly points that, when
using VMA2, bidders 5 to 8 would have obtained higher incomes by reveal-
ing their real attributes (red bars) than trying to manipulate the auction
(purple bars). This does not happens when using Vickrey auction as alloca-
tion method since bidders obtained higher benefits when they bidded false
attributes (green bars) than when revealing the real ones (blue bars).
6.3.3. Scenario3
Finally, this subsection analyzes the performance of VMA2 when includ-
ing an auctioneer provided priority attribute in the auction mechanism in
order to improve fairness in the auction process. Moreover, VMA2 is com-
pared with PA. The results are shown in terms of agents revenue (Figures 10
and 11) while fairness is evaluated using Gini’s index.
The bar chart in Figure 10 shows that when using a priority attribute,
almost all the service agents have not needed to spend as much money to
allocate their services than in the previous scenarios (without priority at-
tributes). This is clearly seen in the expenditure done by SA2. In cases
where the costs have not been reduced (SA 1 and 4) the cost for the service
allocations has been very similar to the one resulting from not using a priority
attribute. Thus we can say that the inclusion of fairness into the mechanism
can reduce the costs for the auctioneers. When comparing PA and VMA2
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Figure 10: Service Agents (auctioneers) and Resource Providers (bidders) revenue when
using VMA2 without a priority attribute (blue), when using a multi-attribute adaptation
of the PA algorithm (red) and when using VMA2 with a priority attribute (green).
from the auctioneers point of view, we can see how the service costs have
been similar. Regarding the benefits of the service providers, it can be seen
that the use of a priority attribute considerably changes the distribution of
the revenues. The differences between the richest and the poorest service
providers are significantly reduced when including fairness into the mecha-
nism (e.g. RP2 and RP3 against RP6). Another remarkable fact is that
bidders which obtained poor revenues (e.g. RP6 and RP7) increase their
benefits. However, it is also important to notice that the inclusion of fair-
ness into the mechanism has modified the ranking of the wealthiest service
providers (e.g. RP3 goes from being the richest agent to the third richest
one).
To evaluate the fairness of the allocations revenue, Figure 11 presents
a box plot of the gini’s index (Gastwirth, 1972) corresponding to the 200
executions of the scenario. It clearly shows that VMA2 provides the lower
inequality coefficient (0.102), this fact can also be observed on the bar chart
where the green bars corresponding to the bidders present a lower gap be-
tween the richest and the poorest agents. The inequality coefficient obtained
by PA is also lower than the coefficient obtained when no priority is used
(0.224 against 0.469). Thus, by observing both plots we can conclude that
the use of priorities as an auctioneer provided attribute can improve the fair-
ness of the task allocation by assigning some services to the weaker agents
without increasing the global cost of the allocation, however by using this
methodology, some of the strongest bidders may experience envy as their in-
comes could be reduced and their position in the wealth rank altered for the
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Figure 11: Gini’s index for the resulting allocations when using VMA2 with different pri-
ority attributes:using VMA2 without a priority attribute (1), when using a multi-attribute
adaptation of the PA algorithm (2) and when using VMA2 with a priority attribute (3).
sake of equity. Further research should involve the use of different priority
calculation methods in order to overcome this problem (e.g, by using less
aggressive functions or stochastic priorities).
7. Conclusions
In this paper the need of reviewing multi-attribute auction mechanisms
named VMA2 based on the different kinds of attributes is posed. Particu-
larly, the attributes are divided between verifiable bidder provided attributes,
which define the physical characteristics of the auctioned item, unverifiable
bidder attributes, which are related with the bidders internal valuation of
the auctioned item, and auctioneer provided attributes, which are used to
express evaluations and opinions of the auctioneers regarding the bidders.
From the attribute classification, a new reverse multi-attribute mecha-
nism based on the role of the attributes is presented. On the one hand, the
distinction between different attribute roles ensures incentive compatibility
during the bidding process as offering untruthful unverifiable attributes may
reduce the chances of winning the auction (underbidding) or in a revenue-lost
(overbidding). On the other hand, verifiable attributes can be used to com-
pare the delivered item with the one which was offered during the auction
process, allowing auctioneers to readjust their payments when bidders do not
respect the auction agreement. Furthermore, the use of auctioneer provided
attributes (e.g. priorities) allows to include different social welfare configu-
rations as well as to add other concepts such as trust or robustness to the
mechanism.Particularly, in this paper we have illustrated how an egalitarian
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allocation can be achieved.
The presented mechanism has been tested in a simulator which reproduces
the operation of an industry organization in which workflows are trying to
externalize tasks using auctions (price and time are the attributes involved
during the process). In the simulations, VMA2, has been compared with
other auction mechanisms such as uni-attribute auctions and a Vickrey adap-
tion for multi-attribute auctions. The experiments have shown that VMA2
can achieve an optimal revenue for the auctioneers without jeopardizing the
quality of the attributes (represented as delays during the simulation), and
that the presented mechanism encourages truthful bidding as bidders obtain
higher utilities when they choose to reveal their real preferences. The tests
also show how, with VMA2, the utility of the auctioneers is preserved when
bidders do not deliver their items in the agreed conditions thanks to the
use of verifiable attributes. These results are compared to a Vickrey multi-
attribute auction where under these circumstances, the auctioneers utility
dramatically decreases. Regarding the analysis of social welfare through the
use of auctioneer-provided attributes (priorities), the experiments show the
difference with previous mechanism that follow ad hoc approaches which in-
clude priorities on the winner determination problem but not in the payment
method. Thus, handling this kind of information (priority) as auctioneer pro-
vided attributes, as we are proposing, offers the possibility of dealing with
the attributes in a holistic approach along all of the mechanism steps.
The work presented on this paper has been developed but it is not limited
to a supply chain management domain. An interesting work would be to
export and to test VMA2 to new and sizzling domains as the smart electric
grid where we are conducting our future research.
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